We model and measure the effects of the Northeast Dairy Compact on prices, quantities, and producer and consumer welfare, underscoring the distribution of these effects across regions and among producer and buyers. Using 1999 as a base year, simulations show that the Compact raises the farm price of milk in the Northeast by $0.45/cwt., lowers the farm price of milk in the rest of the country by $0.02/cwt., and transfers income from producers outside the Compact region and buyers in the Compact region to producers in the Compact region. We find that non-Compact producer losses exceed Compact producer gains. Similar results are found for a scenario of Compact contagionextension of the Compact to include additional states. In both cases, the Compact changes the distribution of the costs and benefits of price discrimination as practiced by milk marketing orders. We conclude that the regional distribution of the Compact's welfare effects raises again the question of the organization of a government-sponsored milk marketing plan such as the FMMO system.
As expected, and as our analysis shows, Northeast producers-who produce a relatively small portion of the country's milk-have a correspondingly small effect on national milk prices. Nonetheless, the Compact has been controversial because (i) its welfare effects are distributed unevenly among producers and consumers of different regions, and (ii) because it sets the precedent for other states to possibly join the Northeast Compact or establish new compacts. We analyze and discuss both of these points. We show that an expanded Compact (or more compacts) would have greater influence on milk markets throughout the country. Further, we argue that independent, regional administration of classified prices by compacts puts pressure on the FMMO system, a central part of U.S. dairy regulation for more than sixty years.
A Brief Description of Milk Marketing Orders
Milk marketing orders use price discrimination to raise the average price received by Grade A producers, setting minimum prices that may be paid for Grade A (fluid eligible) milk according to how that milk is used. The minimum prices for milk used in cheese, and milk used in butter and dry milk are set by federal orders according to formulae that take into account the wholesale prices of these products. The minimum price for milk used in fluid products in each order is set as a fixed differential over the manufacturing-use minimum prices 2 . These administratively determined fluid differentials are not uniform across orders, but generally increase with an order's distance from Wisconsin. Each marketing order pools milk revenues from all end-use classes and pays a uniform, market-wide average price to individual farmers delivering milk to that order (USDA-AMS (a), Blaney, et al.; Bailey (1997) ; Erba and Novakovic; Sumner and Cox) . The average, or blend price in any order depends not only on the classified prices but also on the utilization rates of the various milk classes, which also vary from order to order. Thus, producer prices vary across orders.
Each federal order is analytically similar to a certain type of cartel, as typically considered by economists. Often, members of a cartel, for example OPEC, increase profits by colluding to limit supplies. Federal milk marketing orders do not limit total quantity of raw milk, but achieve added revenue through price discrimination. A Federal
Milk Marketing Order raises the price of milk sold for fluid uses. By raising the fluid milk price and pooling revenues from that market with revenues from sales for manufactured product uses (for which demand is more elastic), the marketing order reduces fluid sales and raises overall production.
The entire FMMO system also can be thought of as a type of "cartel". By establishing the relationship among minimum prices across regions, the FMMO system creates a certain distribution of producer benefits among regions (Cox and Chavas) .
Further, by setting different minimum prices (and thus different relative producer benefits) in different regions, the FMMO system creates potential for arbitrage, but limits arbitrage activity with disincentives to ship milk between regions (Bailey (1997), Manchester) . This system has endured with modifications for more than sixty years in part because coordinated administration and enforcement of the classified pricing system has reduced independent action by the regional marketing orders.
Basic economic reasoning and evidence from many industries indicate that response to higher prices by individual members makes many such arrangements difficult to sustain. The economics literature of oligopoly refers to analogous behavior of cartel members as "cheating" on a cartel (Stigler (1964); Stigler (1975) ). Because marketing orders do not control supply, "cheating" in this context takes on a novel form that we discuss in a later section.
Most major milk markets are regulated by the federal system of marketing orders.
In 1998 about two-thirds of the Grade A milk produced in the country was regulated by the FMMO system. Of those markets not covered by the federal system, most belong to a state order. Of the state marketing orders, California is the most important, producing about 18% of the country's Grade A milk. California's pricing mechanism differs from that of the FMMO, but the differences are not crucial for our analysis here. The
California milk-pricing system also can be described as a government-sponsored cartel 3 .
Because it is administered independently of the FMMO, the California system does not bear the same implications for stability, as we discuss later. 
A Brief Description of The Northeast Dairy Compact

Qualitative Implications for Prices and Welfare
The Northeast Compact deviates from the pricing rules of the FMMO system for milk sold in New England by administering a minimum Class I milk price independent of the FMMO pricing system, thereby raising the average producer price for dairy farms delivering milk to New England processors. As a result, fluid milk consumers in those states face higher milk prices. Dairy farms not selling to New England processors lose, since the higher producer price in New England increases milk supply in those states and lowers the price of milk for producers throughout the rest of the country.
It is not surprising then that the Compact has faced controversy on two fronts. By raising Class I prices, the Compact transfers income from milk consumers to dairy farms within New England. The transfer can also be seen as a payment from relatively populous states, such as Massachusetts, to states with many dairy farms, such as Vermont. Indeed, it was such an interpretation that prompted the Massachusetts state legislature to consider seriously the possibility of withdrawing from the Compact (Tynan, Clancy) .
The Compact is also controversial because of the effect such an institution can have on milk markets outside of the Compact region. As our results show quantitatively, the Compact raises the producer price in New England, which brings forth increased milk production from those states. Under classified pricing, additional production is allocated to the lower-priced manufacturing milk market, resulting in lower minimum class prices and blend prices for producers throughout the country. In the context of the FMMO system as a government-sponsored "cartel", the Compact legally evades the FMMO rules. Indeed, the Compact acts as a type of cartel within the larger FMMO system (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, p.456) . But the FMMO system is not the typical, quantityrestricting cartel, and evasion or cartel cheating here takes a novel form. The Compact raises prices in its own region and, thus, increases production without regard for those producers outside the Compact who receive a lower milk price as a result of the increased production.
Because New England produces a relatively small portion of the country's milk, the Northeast Compact has a relatively small effect on the price of manufacturing milk.
However, dairy farms in other regions have a similar incentive as New England producers to raise Class I prices through compacts. If other states join the Northeast
Compact or form similar regional compacts, the costs imposed on fluid milk consumers and non-compact producers will rise. Further, the potential for local administration of independent, regional classified prices raises questions about the continued sustainability of a nationally coordinated milk marketing system.
In the next section, we model and measure the effects of the Northeast Compact on milk prices and quantities, and on various producer and consumer groups. In a later section, we use the model to illustrate the effect of an expanded dairy compact or additional regional compacts. 
Modeling the Effects of the Compact
The average, or blend price, represented by the curved line in Figure 1 , asymptotically approaches the aggregate demand curve under the FMMO's fixed differential policy, D f (P m +d)+D m (P m ), as P m falls and an increasing share of milk is sold as Class m.
Equilibrium in this market is determined by the intersection of the blend price curve and the supply curve. Given this quantity supplied, the price for manufacturing milk, labeled P m *, is read off the aggregate demand curve. The marketing order sets the fluid price at P f *=P m *+d, at which price fluid demand is D f (P f *). The quantity of milk sold to the manufacturing market is the difference between supply and fluid demand.
Unlike the FMMO, the Compact sets a fluid price directly (as opposed to setting a differential) such that the effective fluid price under the Compact is no lower, and often higher, than the price set by the marketing order. The Compact, if it is to have any effect, raises the minimum price of Class f milk and transfers the additional revenues to producers. Figure 2 represents the same supply curve and fluid demand curve (those for New England) as in Figure 1 . The manufacturing demand curve, also the same as in In the following section, we parameterize the model and estimate the Compact's effect on prices, quantities, and producer and consumer welfare. In a later section, we explore the possibility of growth of the Compact to include a larger share of national milk production.
Measuring Policy Incidence
Like previous users of similar models (Ippolito and Masson, Blaney et al.; Kwoka; Dahlgran; Cox and Chavas; Sumner and Cox; and Sumner and Wolf) , we assume locally linear supply and demand throughout the paper. Our results would be similar under a constant elasticity or other functional form specification. Our methodology is as follows:
1. Use public data collected under the Compact regime and elasticities from previous studies to parameterize the New England milk supply curve, the New
England fluid milk demand curve, and the share of the national demand curve for manufacturing milk facing New England.
2. Using these supply and demand curves, simulate the equilibrium for the counter-factual scenario in which milk is priced according to the FMMO pricing rules in the absence of the Compact.
3. Compare prices, quantities, and welfare under the two regimes.
4. Consider the influence of parameter choices through sensitivity analysis (see appendix).
We parameterize the linear supply and demand model of Figure 2 using annual milk marketing data and supply and demand elasticities drawn from the agricultural economics literature. We use the most recent year with available data, 1999, as a base year for our simulations 13 . Our data consist of annual quantities and annual average prices of Class I milk and all milk published by the USDA and the Compact Commission.
The data for the Compact region are listed in the first column of numbers in Table 1 14 .
Data for the entire FMMO system are also included in Table 1 price less the imputed average manufacturing price. These data give us an observation on the fluid demand curve, one on the supply curve (which is also on the blend price curve), and another on the manufacturing demand curve.
A range of raw milk supply elasticities can be found in the agricultural economics 
where η is the demand elasticity in i (i = New England, United States); ε is the milk supply elasticity from the entire country less New England; and s is New England's share of the country's manufacturing milk production. In 1999, the New England states supplied only 3% of the nation's manufacturing milk. Given a supply elasticity of 1.0 and a national demand elasticity of -0.2, the elasticity of demand for manufacturing milk facing the Northeast is -39. Manufacturing milk demand facing New England is very elastic because New England produces such a small portion of the nation's manufacturing milk. Although Figures 1 and 2 focus attention on the New England milk market, the effects of the Compact on the rest of the country are built into the model through our i ROC specification of the demand for manufacturing milk. In our model, price changes along the manufacturing milk demand curve facing New England (depicted in Figures 1 and 2) represent changes in the national price for manufacturing milk.
Using the data (Table 1) to anchor our supply and demand curves, the elasticities we choose imply the following (locally) linear specifications of the supply and demand curves:
New England milk supply: Q S (P) = 4.3390P;
New England inverse fluid demand: P f (Q f ) = 108.60 -3.0046Q f ;
New England inverse manufacturing demand: P m (Q m ) = 13.5221 -0.0092Q m .
We simulate the equilibrium for the No-Compact scenario by apply the FMMO price discrimination policy (Figure 1 ) to the market defined by these supply and demand equations. The no-Compact equilibrium is found as the intersection of the supply curve and the blend price curve, given a fluid differential of $3.72/cwt. (imputed from the data in Table 1 ). Table 2 Because manufacturing milk demand is more elastic than fluid demand, the derivative of s i with respect to P m is positive; for a given fall in the price of manufacturing milk, manufacturing quantity demanded rises by a greater amount than does fluid quantity demanded, causing the fluid utilization rate to fall. Thus, a fall in P m due to the Compact causes the blend price in other federal orders to fall by more than the change in P m . But for small changes in the manufacturing milk price we can ignore the change in fluid utilization and approximate the effect on order i's blend price as
Thus, to a very close approximation, the fall in the manufacturing milk price due to the Compact translates into fall of the same magnitude in the blend price received by producers in other regions.
The effects of lower manufacturing milk prices on producers outside of the Compact region (who do not deliver milk New England) are presented in Table 3 . To highlight the interests of producers in various regions, we show losses to producers in California, Wisconsin and Minnesota-three major milk-producing states 16 . The loss to all producers outside the Compact region is also shown in Table 3 . We assume a supply elasticity of 1.0 in each state. From equation (7) 
The net effect of the Compact on producers and consumers throughout the United
States is the sum of the welfare effects reported in Tables 2 and 3 
Compact Contagion
Compact contagion refers to the potential growth of the dairy compact movement. If the Compact grows to include a larger share of the nation's milk productionand more specifically, the nation's milk sold for manufacturing uses-it will have an increased effect on the national manufacturing milk price. In our model, equation (4) The prices and quantities that result from raising the fluid class price to $17.78 are reported in Table 4 in the column labeled "Contagion". Table 4 
Federal Milk Marketing Order Stability
The dairy compact movement raises questions about the organization of the FMMO system. The expansion of the Northeast Compact and the creation of additional regional compacts are distinct possibilities (although not certain). How would regional administration of regional, independent classified prices affect the FMMO system?
A challenge for the typical, supply-limiting cartel is to enforce supply controls despite incentives created by the cartel for individual members to increase production (Stigler 1964 ). In the case of the dairy industry, the FMMO has served as enforcer of an implicit agreement among dairy farms across the country regarding how milk prices should be set in the various regions of the country. The terms of trade set and enforced by the FMMO system for each order determine the distribution of the benefits and costs of price discrimination among producers and consumers of the various regions (Cox and 
Conclusion
The Northeast Dairy Compact raises milk prices for those producers whose milk it regulates, creating for them additional producer surplus at the expense of fluid milk consumers in the Compact region and producers not delivering milk to New England. 2. The difference between gains in producer surplus and losses in fluid consumer surplus is not deadweight loss because of the Compact's effects on producers and consumers outside the Compact region. We calculate these effects in Table 3. 3. Percentage change is change in producer surplus as a share of revenue.
4. Percentage change is change in consumer surplus as a share of expenditure. Table 2 ). 
Footnotes
1 We do not attribute consumer surplus to different groups beyond the farmgate, and remain agnostic about the distribution of consumer surplus measures among milk processors, retailers, and final consumers. See Cotterill and Franklin, and Bailey (2001) for analysis and discussion of the Compact's effects on retail milk margins and prices. 2 Although the details of the FMMO pricing rules have changed over time, the key element of price discrimination remains; the minimum price for milk used in fluid products is set at a premium over the minimum price set for milk used in manufactured dairy products. The changes in FMMO pricing rules do not change this fact, and do not change our results or conclusions. Manchester and Blaney discuss the evolution of the FMMO pricing rules and the current set of pricing rules. 7 Marketing orders actually work with three, four or five classes of milk: one for fluid uses; two or three for soft products such as cottage cheese or ice cream; and one or two for butter, non-fat dry milk, and cheese. Aggregating all the non-fluid use classes into a single class for all manufactured dairy products simplifies the exposition while still capturing the essence of price discrimination. 8 Since manufactured dairy products are traded across the country, we use a factor-price equalization argument to argue that the price of manufacturing milk is approximately equal across the country. Alternatively, we can argue that the minimum price formulae for milk used in cheese and in butter and skim powder are the same across all federal orders, so that these prices are equal across regions and highly, positively correlated.
Further, the California and federal systems use pricing formulae that are based on prices for the same, publicly traded dairy products. In any case, it is at least approximately true that there is a single price of manufacturing milk across the country, and this is certainly true relative to the wide variation in the price of milk used for fluid products. 9 In reality, marketing orders set minimum prices for manufacturing milk according to formulae that take into account the wholesale prices of manufactured dairy product traded in a competitive market. Our assumption that P m is set by a competitive market is equivalent to assuming that marketing orders set minimum prices that clear markets. 10 As with the other literature on milk marketing orders, we ignore over-order premiums here. Inclusion of over-order premiums would not change our analysis significantly, and the direction of the Compact's effects would be the same as found here as long as the Compact Class f price is set above the price that would have been paid for Class f milk.
To the extent that over-order premiums are paid in the absence of the Compact, our results will overestimate the increase in the Class f price due to the Compact. 11 If minimum prices for manufacturing class milk are at or below support prices, additional sales of milk on the manufacturing market could result in government purchases of manufactured products. We ignore government purchases in this paper. 12 The lower manufacturing price has a similar effect on producers of manufacturing grade (Grade B) milk, including those located within the Northeast region, since Grade B and Class m milk are substitutes in manufactured dairy products. This also applies to Grade A producers who are outside both federal and state marketing orders. 13 The specific numerical results depend on our choice of base year. We use the most recent data available. The Compact played less of a role in 1998 due to higher FMMO prices. Thus, had we used 1998 as a base year, the effects of the Compact would be smaller in magnitude but in the same direction as our findings. 14 Note that we use annual quantities and average annual prices, while the FMMO and the Compact both set monthly prices. The monthly fluid class price announced for the New England FMMO actually exceeded $16.94 in five months in 1999. Since the Compact's minimum price is max($16.94, FMMO Class I price), the average annual Compact price actually exceeded $16.94 in 1999. Use of annual data also masks the fact that the fixed Class I price is less responsive than the FMMO Class I prices, which are updated monthly and are positively correlated with dairy product prices. We do not consider the implications of such inflexibility in this paper. 15 The Northeast Compact eventually instituted a complex supply tax and redistribution scheme. Starting in July 2000, $0.075 per cwt. of all Class I milk is to be withheld from the Compact's revenues and paid into an escrow fund. These funds would then be paid back to producers who increase production by no more than one percent of the previous year's production. Half of the fund is distributed uniformly to all eligible producers, regardless of an individual farm's level of production. The other half is paid to eligible producers on a per hundredweight basis (Northeast Dairy Compact Commission; Bailey (2000) ). The scheme does not guarantee success in preventing growth in milk production. If the minimum fluid price set by the Compact is more than $0.075 greater than the minimum FMMO price, some producers will find it profitable to increase production under the Compact. Moreover, the supply management mechanism introduces yet another distortion, giving perverse incentives to Compact dairy farms by forcing larger and/or growing farms to subsidize smaller farms. 16 California's milk pricing policy is different than the FMMO system (see California Department of Food and Agriculture, and Sumner and Wolf). However, the formulae used to set minimum prices for manufacturing milk in California, like those for the
